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ARE WEIGHTED GAMES SUFFICIENTLY GOOD FOR
BINARY VOTING?
SASCHA KURZ
Abstract. Binary “yes”-“no” decisions in a legislative committee
or a shareholder meeting are commonly modeled as a weighted
game. However, there are noteworthy exceptions. E.g., the voting
rules of the European Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon
use a more complicated construction. Here we want to study the
question if we loose much from a practical point of view, if we re-
strict ourselves to weighted games. To this end, we invoke power
indices that measure the influence of a member in binary decision
committees. More precisely, we compare the achievable power dis-
tributions of weighted games with those from a reasonable superset
of weighted games.
JEL classification: C61, C71
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1. Introduction
Consider a family, consisting of mother Ann, father Bob, and the two kids
Cathrin and Dave, deciding on their joint weekend activities. In a weighted
game each voter i has a non-negative weight wi and a proposal is accepted
if the sum of the weights of its supporters meets or exceeds a positive quota
q. As an abbreviation we write [q;w1, . . . , wn] for a weighted game with n
voters. The example [3; 3, 2, 1, 1] (where we number in alphabetical order)
might model a slightly parents biased, especially mother biased, decision
rule. Another voting rule might be that either both parents or both kids
have to agree. It can be shown that no representation as a weighted game
exists. Since all family members have equal opportunities to influence the
final decision, all reasonable measures of voting power assign equal power to
all members. The weighted games [2; 1, 1, 1, 1] or [3; 1, 1, 1, 1] have the same
power distribution (while [3; 3, 2, 1, 1] has not). If we only care about the
resulting power distribution we can also choose a weighted game in our situ-
ation. Even more practically, we may accept a weighted game as a plausible
replacement of the original voting rule if the corresponding power distribu-
tion does not differ too much. Here we want to study the question how large
this difference can be in the worst case.
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A related problem is the so-called inverse power index problem, where one
wants to determine the game whose power distribution is closest to a pre-
defined target power distribution. For more details see e.g. [De et al.(2017)]
and the reference cited therein. [Alon and Edelman(2010)] have shown that
some target power distributions, where most players have negligible or even
zero power, like e.g. (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . , 0), cannot be approximated too closely
by the power distribution of any game.1 Our setting differs as follows. In-
stead of all non-negative vectors summing to one, we only consider the power
distributions attained by a superset of weighted games as possible target
power distributions and ask to what extend they can be approximated by
the power distribution of a weighted game.
2. Preliminaries
By N = {1, . . . , n} we denote the set of voters. A simple game is a surjective
and monotone mapping v : 2N → {0, 1} from the set of subsets of N into a
binary output {0, 1}. Monotone means v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N .
A simple game v is weighted if there exist weights w1, . . . , wn ∈ R≥0 and a
quota q ∈ R>0 such that v(S) = 1 iff w(S) :=
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. As stated in the
introduction, we abbreviate a weighted game by [q;w1, . . . , wn], Two voters i
and j are called symmetric, in a given simple game v, if v(S∪{i}) = v(S∪{j})
for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i, j}. Voter i ∈ N is a null voter if v(S) = v(S ∪ {i})
for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i}. Given two simple games v and v′ we define their
intersection v ∧ v′ via (v ∧ v′)(S) = min {v(S), v′(S)} for all S ⊆ N . Simi-
larly, the union is given by (v ∨ v′)(S) = max {v(S), v′(S)} for all S ⊆ N .
The non-weighted decision rule from the introduction can be written as
[2; 2, 0, 1, 1] ∧ [2; 0, 2, 1, 1] or [2; 1, 1, 0, 0] ∨ [2; 0, 0, 1, 1]. It is well known that
every simple game can be written as the intersection (or union) of a finite list
of weighted games. Also combinations of ∧ and ∨ are used in practice. An
example is given by the voting system of the European Council according to
the Treaty of Lisbon. For n = 27 (or n = 28) countries the voting system
can be written as v = ([0.55n; 1, . . . , 1] ∧ [0.65; p1, . . . , pn])∨ [n− 3; 1, . . . , 1],
where pi denotes the relative population of country i. As remarked by
[Kirsch and Langner(2011)], dropping the union with [n − 3; 1, . . . , 1] has
almost no impact on the characteristic function v or corresponding power
distributions. Consisting of a Boolean combination, i.e., ∧’s and ∨’s, of three
weighted games the stated representation of the voting system of the Euro-
pean Council (according to the Treaty of Lisbon) is relatively compact. For
a general simple game for n voters an exponential number of weighted games
1More precisely, [Alon and Edelman(2010)] show such a result for the Banzhaf index.
Results for other power indices have been obtained by [Kurz(2016)].
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can be necessary in the worst case, see [Faliszewski et al.(2009)]. Writting
down the characteristic function v explicitly also has exponential complex-
ity, while a weighted game can be written by listing n integer weights and
a quota. Framed differently, the number of simple games is many orders of
magnitudes larger than the number of weighted games.
As a class of binary voting systems between simple games and weighted
games we consider complete simple games, see [Carreras and Freixas(1996)].
They are based on Isbell’s desirability relation, see [Isbell(1956)], where we
write i  j if v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S ∪ {j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j} for two voters
i, j ∈ N . A simple game v is called complete if this relation is complete,
i.e., if for all i, j ∈ N we have i  j or j  i. Two players i, j ∈ N are
symmetric iff i  j or j  i. The relation  induces an ordering of the
players, which is satisfied in many practical applications. E.g. the voting
systems of the European Council (according to the Treaty of Lisbon and
also those before) are complete simple games. Here we use the standard
assumption 1  2  · · ·  n and note that SSI(v) and BZI(v) are non-
increasing vectors for every complete simple game v. In order to uniquely
characterize a complete simple game v we can list all subsets S ⊆ N such that
v(S) = 1 and for every i ∈ S, j /∈ S with i < j we have v(S\{i} ∪ {j}) = 0.
For our example [3; 3, 2, 1, 1] those subsets are given by {1} and {2, 4}. In
our example [2; 2, 0, 1, 1] ∧ [2; 0, 2, 1, 1] the voters 1 and 2 as well as voters 3
and 4 are symmetric. For all other pairs of different voters we neither have
i  j nor j  i, i.e., the game is not complete.
A power index p is a mapping from the set of simple (or weighted) games
on n voters into Rn. By pi(v) we denote the ith component of p(v), i.e., the
power of voter i. Here we consider two of the most commonly used power
indices, i.e., the Shapley-Shubik index
SSIi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|! · (n− |S| − 1)!
n!
· (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S))
and the Penrose-Banzhaf index
BZIi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i} (v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S))∑
j∈N
∑
S⊆N\{j} (v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S))
.
For our first example v = [3; 3, 2, 1, 1] we have SSI(v) = 1
12
· (7, 3, 1, 1) ≈
(0.5833, 0.25, 0.0833, 0.0833) and BZI(v) = 1
10
·(5, 3, 1, 1) = (0.5, 0.3, 0.1, 0.1).
As a measure for the distance between two different power distributions
x, y ∈ Ri we use the Manhattan distance d1(x, y) =
∑n
i=1 |xi − yi| and the
Chebyshev distance d∞(x, y) = max1≤i≤n |xi − yi|. For the above two power
distributions the Manhattan distance is 1
6
≈ 0.1667 and the Chebyshev dis-
tance is 1
12
≈ 0.0833.
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3. Results
In the introduction we have noticed that [2; 1, 1, 1, 1] as well as [3; 1, 1, 1, 1]
yield the power distribution (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) both for the Shapley-
Shubik and the Banzhaf index. In Table 1 we state the number of different
power distributions for the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index that are
attained by weighted games with n ≤ 8 voters. The corresponding numbers
for complete simple games are listed in Table 2.
n 3 4 5 6 7 8
#SSI 4 11 53 536 14188 1364907
#BZI 4 12 57 555 14720 1366032
Table 1. Number of different vectors SSI(v) and BZI(v) for
weighted games v with n voters.
n 3 4 5 6 7 8
#SSI 4 11 53 536 17973 6314952
#BZI 4 12 57 555 18600 4616157
Table 2. Number of different vectors SSI(v) and BZI(v) for
complete simple games v with n voters.
We observe that the counts coincide for n ≤ 6, which is no surprise for
n ≤ 5, since every complete simple game consisting of at most 5 voters is
weighted. However, for n = 6 voters there exist 1171 − 1111 = 60 complete
simple games that are not weighted. Nevertheless, the power distributions
according to the Shapley-Shubik index or the Banzhaf index of these 60 non-
weighted complete simple games are also exactly attained by weighted games,
respectively. So, if we are only interested in the resulting power distribution,
then including complete non-weighted games comes with no benefit for n ≤ 6
voters. For n ∈ {7, 8} we do not have such a strong result. Here the number
of attained power distributions for complete simple games is significantly
larger. This goes in line with the fact that there are 43 13− 29 373 = 14 940
and 16 175 188−2 730 164 = 13 445 024 non-weighted complete simple games
for n = 7 and n = 8 voters, respectively. There we can only give a worst-
case bound for the minimum distance between the power distribution of a
complete simple game and a weighted game. To this end, we denote the set
of weighted games with n voters by WG(n) and the set of complete simple
games with n voters by CG(n). Moreover, let
ωpa(n) := max {min {da(p(c), p(v)) : v ∈ WG(n)} : c ∈ CG(n)} ,
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where a ∈ {1,∞} and p ∈ {SSI,BZI}, be the worst-case distance between
the power distribution p(c) of a complete simple game c and the power
distribution p(v) of its best approximation by a weighted game v.
Proposition 1.
ωSSI1 (7) = 0.0666667 ω
SSI
1 (8) = 0.0666667
ωSSI∞ (7) = 0.0166667 ω
SSI
∞ (8) = 0.0154762
ωBZI1 (7) = 0.0599700 ω
BZI
1 (8) = 0.0567084
ωBZI∞ (7) = 0.0173913 ω
BZI
∞ (8) = 0.0139124
Proof. The proof is obtained by a computer enumeration. First, we loop
over all elements v inWG(n) and store the corresponding power distributions
p(v) in a k-d-tree (a data structure for storing multi-dimensional geometrical
data). Afterwords, we loop over all elements c in CG(n), compute p(c), and
perform a nearest neighbor search within the previously computed k-d-tree.
Let v denote the nearest neighbor that minimizes dpa(p(v), p(c)). Eventually
update the worst-case distance with dpa(p(v), p(c)). 
As an example we state that the complete simple game attaining ωBZI∞ (7) =
0.0173913 is uniquely characterized by the subsets {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, {2, 3, 5, 6},
and {1, 3, 7}. For n = 8 the extremal complete simple games all contain a
unique null voter. We remark that the same enumeration is computationally
infeasible for n = 9 voters since the numbers #WG(9) = 993 061 482 and
#CG(9) = 284 432 730 174 are quite large. (See e.g. [Kartak et al.(2015)]
and [Kurz and Tautenhahn(2013)] for the details.) So, for n ≥ 9 we can
only state lower bounds for ωpa(n):
Proposition 2.
ωSSI1 (9) ≥ 0.0634922 ω
SSI
1 (10) ≥ 0.0634922 ω
SSI
1 (11) ≥ 0.0591627
ωSSI∞ (9) ≥ 0.0130953 ω
SSI
∞ (10) ≥ 0.0123016 ω
SSI
∞ (11) ≥ 0.0109308
ωBZI1 (9) ≥ 0.0562 ω
BZI
1
(10) ≥ 0.0552 ωBZI1 (11) ≥ 0.0552
ωBZI∞ (9) ≥ 0.0110 ω
BZI
∞ (10) ≥ 0.0106 ω
BZI
∞ (11) ≥ 0.0100
Proof. Let a ∈ {1,∞} and p ∈ {SSI,BZI}. In [Kurz(2012)] the inverse
power index problem for the Shapley-Shubik index with respect to the Man-
hattan distance d1(·, ·) and the Chebyshev distance d∞(·, ·) within the class
of weighted, complete simple, or simple games was formulated as an integer
linear programming (ILP) problem, which can be solved exactly even for
n > 9, where the number of weighted games is unknown. For the Banzhaf
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index the problem whether a solution of the inverse power index problem
with distance at most δ exists can be formulated as an ILP. Using the bi-
section method for δ the problem can be solved exactly by a sequence of
ILPs, see [Kurz and Napel(2014), Appendix A] for the details. Thus, given
a complete simple game c with n voters we can compute the corresponding
power distribution p(c) and exactly solve the inverse power index problem
within WG(n). If v is a weighted game that minimizes da(p(c), p(v)), then
da(p(c), p(v)) is a lower bound for ω
p
a(n). As heuristic candidates for the
complete simple game c we have used the extremal ones of Proposition 1
and added a suitable number of null voters. 
We remark that we have also tried to use some randomly chosen complete
simple games for c in Proposition 2. However, the resulting lower bounds
for ωpa(n) are rather small. As an example, the value ωSSI1 (7) = 0.0666667
is attained by the complete simple game c characterized by the subsets
{4, 5, 6, 7}, {2, 4}, and {1}. If we add a null voter, the Shapley-Shubik index
is given by (0.5024, 0.1857, 0.1024, 0.1024, 0.03571, 0.03571, 0.03571, 0) with
best possible approximation [84; 38, 27, 19, 16, 9, 9, 3, 0], which also shows
ωSSI
1
(8) ≥ 0.0666667.
For the voting system c of the European Council according to the Lisbon
Treaty we cannot solve the inverse power index problem exactly. However,
for all a ∈ {1,∞} and all p ∈ {SSI,BZI} we can find a weighted game v with
da(p(c), p(v)) < 10
−5, which goes in line with the computational experiments
in [Kurz and Napel(2014)].
4. Conclusion
Does it pay off to use complete simple games instead of weighted games
as binary voting systems? If only the resulting power distributions for the
Shapley-Shubik or the Banzhaf index are relevant, then the answer is prob-
ably no. Whether the worst-case deviations stated in Proposition 1 can be
regarded as negligible might depend on the application. For n > 8 vot-
ers our computational experiments suggest that the worst-case deviations
might even go down with an increasing number of voters. Proving this claim
rigorously might be a hard technical challenge.
We have chosen complete simple games as a reasonable superset of weighted
games since the underlying ordering of the players can be assumed in many
applications. Another reason is that the class of simple games is really
large2 and realizes a lot of power distributions. E.g., the parameterized tar-
get power distribution β(n) = 1
2n−1 · (2, . . . , 2, 1) ∈ R
n has been studied by
2There are at least 2
(√
2
3
pi·2n
)
/(n
√
n) complete simple games, see
[Peled and Simeone(1985)], less than 22
n
simple games, and at most 2n
2−n+1 weighted
games, see [Zunic(2004)].
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[Kurz and Napel(2014)]. For 6 ≤ n ≤ 18 there exists a simple game vn such
that SSI(vn) = β(n), while the best approximation within WG(n) seems to
have a deviation of order Θ( 1
n
). At the very least our values for ωpa(n) give
a lower bound for the corresponding situation where we enlarge the possible
target power distributions to those of simple games.
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